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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
A Constitutional Confession: The
Permanent if Malleable Status of

Indigenous Nations
David E.Wilkins*
I appreciate the opportunity to address such an august group of students
and faculty. When Amy invited me to join you, and she certainly is a very
persuasive person, I debated long and hard on what kind of talk to give
since I study politics comparatively. Although much of my work is infused
with law and history, and a smidgen of culture, economics, and geography,
I work largely at the intersection of politics, history and law, and have
coined the awkward, though accurate, term, "Polegalorian," to describe
what I do. My research is concerned broadly with how indigenous peoples
generate, participate, and are subject to these and other important forces.
My research also deals with how and why the American constituent states,
international bodies, and the federal government, act in the manner they do
towards aboriginal peoples.
I would like to begin with three epigraphs that I have posted on my
office door, because you occasionally find snippets that really sort of
capture certain ideas and themes that you have in mind. These three
epigraphs, I think, typify the deep level of anger and frustration felt about
the topics we will be discussing today. The first one is from Ted Moses,
who is the ambassador for the Cree nation in Canada. He said, "This is a
most peculiar situation. How is it that I, a Cree, whose ancestors lived in
the Cree territory of James Bay for at least 5,000 years, find myself and my
people suddenly subject to the laws of states that were only established a
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few hundred years ago?"' The second one is from Francis Abraham, an
Ojibwa. Abraham said, "Where did the MNR [Ministry of Natural
Resources] get the right to tell us what we can do and what we can't do on
our own land? How come we have to do a land claim while the others who
came and took our land never have to prove anything?"' 2 Finally, there is
the comment from Corn Tassel, a Cherokee, from a speech he made to U.S.
Treaty Commissioners in 1785. He said, "Again, were we to inquire by
what law or authority you set up a claim [to our land], I answer none! Your
laws extend not into our country, nor ever did. You talk
of the law of nature
3
and the law of nations and they are both against you."
These are provocative and gut wrenching statements and represent some
of the genuine and legitimate moral, emotional, and yes, jurisdictional
concerns of aboriginal people. My comments today represent an effort to
try and get a handle on the convoluted, and in some respects irreconcilable,
nature of the political, legal, and cultural status of indigenous nations as
they operate outside, within, and under United States policy and law, and
increasingly under state law as well. Before doing this though, it is
important from a comparative context to understand that what happens to
aboriginal peoples in the United States is not unique to this country.
I would like to share a little from my experience as a Fulbright Fellow
last fall. My family and I had the opportunity to spend the fall semester at
the University of Calgary, "The Texas of Canada" as I was told going in,
and I discovered that characterization to be fairly accurate. It was quite an
experience for many reasons, but the primary reason I sought the
fellowship was to learn something of what conditions are like for First
Nations, Inuit, and M6tis peoples in Canada. One hears about how strong
the democratic State of Canada is, and how it has a fairly tolerant attitude
towards non-white Canadians, but my prior reading of Canadian aboriginal
law and politics had shown me a different side, a darker side, a less tolerant
side, and I wanted to see firsthand what was happening. Of course, Canada
is a massive geopolitical entity, home to over 600 aboriginal communities
with a convoluted treaty history and a budding treaty present. It also is
home to the M6tis, a mixed blood people with their own unique history and
legal status, and also is most recently home to a new territorial government,
Nunavut, a Provincial-like entity governed by the Inuit of the far north. I
knew I would only be getting a taste of what there was to learn, but I was
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Ted Moses, Seeking Justice at the InternationalLevel, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES:
TOWARD SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (Marie Leger ed., 1994).
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SIDNEY L. HARRING, WHITE MAN'S LAW: NATIVE PEOPLE IN NINETEENTHCENTURY CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 273-74 (1998).
3.
DAVID E. WILKINS & TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 19 (2001) (quoting Corn Tassel).
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excited to begin the process.
One can read about such affairs, but book learning is not like actual
visitation or, better yet, residency in a new land. As my principal teacher
and good friend Vine Deloria once put it: "We may misunderstand
something we hear or read, but we cannot misexperience a lived moment or
set of moments." 4 To put it another way, slightly different from what5
Descartes said when he made the statement, "I think; therefore I am[,]
aboriginal peoples might respond by saying, "I experience; therefore I am."
So even though we had only four months to enjoy that breathtaking country
and the diverse peoples of that land, we experienced a great deal during our
time there.
Since the United States and Canada share some common territorial
landmarks, colonial ancestors, and are home to a number of indigenous
nations who, historically and today, lived and traveled across the
constructed border dividing the two, it has long been one of my avowed
goals to continue to expand my research on the similarities and
dissimilarities in the historical trajectories, political relations, and legal
standings of native peoples towards one another, and in relation to the
provinces, states, the national government, and increasingly, vis-&-vis their
relations with the international community. Some of the questions that
gelled in my mind as a result of my short stay in Canada include the
following:
" Why was the treaty process continued, and in fact, recently revived
in Canada, while it problematically ended in the United States in
1871 with no clear sign that it will ever be restarted?
" Why do some aboriginal people in Canada now believe that the
present treaty process is actually a cooptive ploy by the Canadian
State to solidify their already powerful position vis-A-vis First
Nations' peoples?
" Why, despite the professed liberal democratic nature of the
Canadian State, has indigenous self government largely been
denied to First Nations in Canada while in the United States it is, at
least theoretically, a reality enshrined in the Constitution, treaty
relationships, statutory law, and federal policy?
* How were aboriginal peoples in Canada able to have their treaty
rights constitutionally entrenched in 1982, while tribes in the
United States who, in theory, enjoy far more self-governance, have
not been able to garner a similar constitutional safeguard for our
treaty or sovereign rights, notwithstanding that treaties are
considered the supreme law of the land?
4.

Personal Communication with Vine Deloria (April 17, 2000).
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" Why have both countries been unwilling to jettison the factually

inaccurate and morally indefensible "doctrine of discovery" and
the theory of federal and, increasingly, state provincial plenary
power, despite the fact that these concepts are rooted in precolonial notions of European racism and ethnocentrism that
essentially deny the humanity and legal standing of aboriginal
peoples?
• Finally, how is it that both countries emphasize that they have a
fiduciary, or trust relationship, with native nations-a relationship
in which the national government promises to protect and support
aboriginal peoples and which should protect and shield the First
Nations from forces aimed at their destruction or diminution of
their treaty resources or civil rights-yet despite this acknowledged
trust relationship, aboriginal peoples in both states continue to
experience astronomical levels of poverty (except for a few gaming
tribes), gross health conditions, poor education attainment levels,
and have treaty and constitutional rights that can be wiped out quite
easily by the very trust agent charged with protecting aboriginal
rights and powers?
In fact, while I was there, a reporter for the Toronto Globe and Mail, a
leading national newspaper, wrote a fourteen-part series entitled "Canada's
Apartheid," 6 which began just about the time we arrived and concluded just
as we were leaving. In the article the reporter graphically depicted the
ongoing horrendous conditions that aboriginal nations face in Canada,
despite the Canadian government's perception of itself and its projection to
the outside world of it being the most just society around. Unfortunately,
the reporter concluded his otherwise solid series by asserting that the
solution to aboriginal problems was the assimilation of aboriginal peoples.
Even George Bush and Gail Norton, as conservative as they are, are not so
naive as to make such a simplistic ethnocentric statement-at least not
publicly. These were just some of the comparative questions that came to
mind during my stay in Calgary. Other questions are still forming.
While it is premature for me to speak comparatively across these two
countries, I would like to take the remainder of my time to provide you
with a brief, but I think fairly comprehensive, overview of some of the
complex dimensions of aboriginal status in the United States that make for
a perpetually insecure world for native peoples.
The multiple overlapping and often contradictory manifestations of
indigenous status have arisen from the American public's curiously
6.
John Stackhouse, Canada's Apartheid, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 3-Dec. 15,
2001, available at http://www.globeandmail.com/series/apartheid (last visited Mar. 31,
2003).
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ambivalent views of aboriginal peoples, historically contradictory Supreme
Court precedents-I say "historically" because the Rehnquist Court has
been remarkably consistent in its successful attempts to diminish tribal
authority and jurisdictional authority-vacillating congressional statutes,
the long and complicated treaty and agreement record, and thousands of
Byzantine administrative regulations. In fact, in keeping with the Bush
administration's war-like tenor of the day, we could term the contemporary
indigenous situation an "Axis of Insecurity." This is a protean mix of the
Bush administration's policies regarding natural resources, trust funds,
gaming, and state governments that are forcing themselves deeper and
deeper into Indian country despite the constitutional and treaty safeguards
set up long ago that have still not been dislodged. This is all held together
by the Supreme Court's ideological and practical orientation masked by the
alleged neutrality of the rule of law, which is emphatically aimed at the
drastic reduction, if not the formal termination, of tribal sovereignty as we
once experienced it.
Unlike Bush's problematic characterization of the "Axis of Evil," this
"Axis of Insecurity" for tribal nations is real and fluid and has meant a
perpetual destabilized set of statuses for indigenous nations. Over time, and
in an entirely unpredictable and ad hoc way, the statuses have expanded
and multiplied, but their lineage traces to the earliest moments of the
United States-although one could easily push the variations back to
sixteenth century theological debates in Spain about whether or not
indigenous peoples were free persons or slaves. Thus, tribes, as collective
bodies, have an inherent racial, cultural, and national status. United States
law and policy also has accorded them a dependent ward-like status and
later, a corporate status. Tribes have been alternately treated as discrete and
insular minority groups and as local governments or sub-units of
governments. They also have been viewed as social service agencies, as a
result of their poverty, and United States law and policy has regarded tribes
as delegated bodies for purposes of carrying out federal mandates. In
addition, tribes have been statutorily treated as states for some problematic
purposes. These are descriptions of tribes in a collective sense.
Indians and Alaskan natives, as individuals, have a recognized status as
tribal, cultural, and political citizens, eligible for distinctive property rights
and tax exemptions. Although not initially granted state and federal
citizenship due to their pre-existing national status, individual Indians and
Alaskan natives now hold that status and are legally entitled to the services
and benefits open to every American. Due to their indigenous status,
however, native citizens may still be treated as subjects under federal law.
The United States can abrogate or diminish their treaties and collectivelyheld property rights, notwithstanding their sovereign or citizenship status.
This subject status is largely due to congressional plenary power, defined
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here as unlimited and absolute, which was unilaterally and extraconstitutionally generated in the late 1800s via the Kagama7 decision, and a
number of succeeding cases after that aimed at the forcible assimilation of
individual Indians and the dispossession of indigenous collective property
and other rights. This status continues to affect Indians and tribes through
criminal penalties, religious rights, aboriginal title, and treaty
enforcement-or more accurately, lack of enforcement-which are some of
the issues we will be talking about in the panels today.
As a result of these multiple, inherent, assumed, and imposed statuses,
indigenous peoples, as collective bodies and as individuals, are left with an
inconclusive and ambivalent understanding of their political, legal, and
cultural rights, and their actual status vis-d-vis states and the federal
government. In short, the federal government has an indeterminate
relationship with tribal nations and their members, sometimes recognizing
and supporting tribal sovereignty, and sometimes acting to deny, diminish,
or even terminate that status. However, the federal government is always
acting as if it were the superior sovereign in the awkward minuet of
sovereigns.
On the one hand, such indeterminacy accords to imaginative tribal
leaders, American presidents and their agents, federal judges, congressional
lawmakers, and state officials a degree of political and legal flexibility.
Involved parties may successfully navigate otherwise difficult political
terrain by choosing the appropriate indigenous statuses that can benefit
tribal nations and individual Indians. On the other hand, and of greater
import, such ambivalence deprives aboriginal peoples, collectively and
individually, of a clear and consistent understanding regarding the powers
and rights they may exercise, thereby contributing to the ongoing tension
that frequently clouds the relationship between First Nations and other
political or corporate entities.
In the essay that this talk is drawn from, I examined the origin, rationale,
and consequences of several of these collective and individual statuses
using a simple chronological format starting with the grandfather of all
American policy equivocators, Chief Justice John Marshall, and continuing
to the present. The three Indian law cases that Marshall is most noted for,
Johnson v. McIntosh,8 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,9 and Worcester v.
Georgia,'0 were all written in the early 1800s. In these cases, Chief Justice
Marshall openly and deftly manipulated indigenous status by trying to
provide some measure of recognition of Indian rights vis-d-vis the states,

7.
8.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).

9.

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

10.

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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while simultaneously elevating the federal government to a superior
position in relation to tribes. Even though tribes were defacto and dejure
sovereigns, Marshall spoke of indigenous people not only as national and
state-like entities but also as Indians in the conglomerate or cumulative
sense, as a race of people, as individuals, and of course, as domestic
dependant nations. While the last two cases focused only on one tribal
nation, the Cherokee, the principles enunciated have been used to diminish,
and sometimes enhance, the rights of all aboriginal peoples.
From a democratic theory and constitutional perspective this is most
problematic, since each indigenous nation has its own diplomatic
arrangement with the United States-what the President and Congresses of
recent years like to refer to as a government-to-government relationship. So
why should a judicial ruling involving only a single tribal nation be
extrapolated to infringe, or in some cases, affirm the rights of other First
Nations? Tribal nations, after all, are not citizens in a constitutional sense,
as their relationship with the United States is based on a sovereign
recognition of one another's political independence, and individual
Supreme Court rulings should have a bearing only on those tribal parties
directly involved in the litigation. The various statuses constructed by
Marshall-tribes as nations, state-like entities, focusing on individuals, or
as Indians in a collective racial sense-are all distinctly different under the
law. Marshall and subsequent Courts, lawmakers, and bureaucrats have
ventured back and forth, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unwittingly,
between these statuses. In a sense, the Court was only amplifying the
conflicting statuses of aboriginal peoples specified in the United States
Constitution. The Commerce Clause, as we all know, affirms a separate
political status of tribes, while the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I
make reference to Indians not taxed, which identifies the individual status
of Indians who remained out of the political jurisdiction of the United
States.
In the essay, I then moved to discuss Justice Taney's Indian law cases,
such as United States v. Rogers,1 1 which strikingly emphasized the racial
dimension of Indian law that is still with us today. I talked about the
important congressional and judicial actions of the 1860s and 1870s that
redefined Indian status and treaty-making and forced assimilation, which
became a dominant federal policy and legal paradigm. Next, I examined the
notion of American citizenship as it was applied to certain tribal nations
and their citizens and discussed how this has affected
their status from the
12
allotment policy to the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act.

11.

45 U.S. 567 (1846).

12.
Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as 8 U.S.C. §
1401 (b) (2000)).
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In fact, the layering of federal citizenship onto individual Indian
citizenship, later supplemented by various state laws that accorded Indians
the right to vote, has proven most troubling for First Nations members. On
the one hand, individual Indians are now entitled to exercise a franchise in
state elections and in federal elections under the Fifteenth Amendment; on
the other hand, individual Indians are not guaranteed Fourteenth
Amendment protection from their own tribal governments if the tribal
government is acting within its sovereign capacity, as was held in the case
Groundhog v. Keeler.13 So what is our status as American citizens, and
more broadly, did the United States Congress have the power to
unilaterally enfranchise Indians absent our consent?
The 1930s signaled another dramatic shift in indigenous status with the
passage of the Johnson-O'Malley Act 14 (JOM) and the Indian
Reorganization Act15 (IRA) in 1934. JOM brought the states into a more
prominent role in Indian affairs, while the IRA, the most important piece of
legislation dealing with the indigenous status in the past century, was much
more comprehensive in its focus. While designed to counteract the ravages
of allotment era policies and to encourage, some say to insist, that the tribes
establish constitutional-type governments, it also served to dichotomize
tribes into federally recognized and non-recognized entities. A vital
question for such federally incorporated tribes is this: Does such
incorporation make the indigenous polity an instrumentality of the federal
government? Not surprisingly, there is conflicting evidence on this
important question. In some cases it has been held that tribes, in
relationship to states and municipal governments, are to be treated as
federal instrumentalities; but in other cases, tribes have been held not to
have such status under the meaning of the federal statutes.
Finally, I looked at the chain of events inspired by the federal
government's termination policy, which began in the 1950s, and the
stunning political, social, and cultural indigenous activism that termination
inspired in the 1960s and 1970s. The rash of events resulting from that
era's activism, especially the Civil Rights Movement, revived old
indigenous statuses and created new ones that have continuing effect today.
These include (i) tribes as discrete and insular minorities that require
special protection from discrimination, (ii) tribes as dependant and
geographically incorporated communities with reduced governing powers
because of their alleged dependency status, (iii) tribes as states (TAS), (iv)

13.
442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
14.
Johnson-O'Malley Act, ch 147, 48 Stat. 596 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 452-57 (2000)).
15.
Indian Reorganization Act, ch 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)).
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the TAS treatment as states for purposes of environmental and taxation
legislation in the shifting arrangement of federalism, and (v) tribes and
their members as poverty stricken groups deserving federal assistance, not
because of their distinctive treaty or political status, but because of their
American citizenship and weakened socio-economic standing. Importantly,
these statuses did not supplant the pre-existing ones. They simply were
added on, making an already convoluted situation even more confusing.
One of the important dimensions that resurfaced powerfully in the 1970s
was the question of whether tribes were political or racial entities, although
why this was pitched as a zero-sum situation has always eluded me.
In Morton v. Mancari,16 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the political
status of tribes by throwing out a challenge to the preference policy
operating in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Despite the anti-affirmative
action position of the Rehnquist Court, the Mancari decision was
reaffirmed in Rice v. Cayetano.17 Ironically, this was a case involving the
political and racial status of Hawaiian natives. Kennedy and the majority
went to great lengths to distinguish the status of Hawaiian natives from
American Indians to the detriment of Hawaiian natives, and, at least in this
narrow instance, to the advantage of federally recognized tribes. One of the
most important elements of the Mancari ruling, cited positively by both
Kennedy for the majority and Stevens in dissent, was the notion that federal
legislation singling out American Indians, though not Hawaiians, would be
upheld as long as the special treatment could be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations to Indians-the old "tied
rationality doctrine." Here we see the generic word "Indians" figuring
prominently into the Court's calculus, not as specific tribes, and certainly
not as Hawaiian natives. Of course, the so-called "tied rationality doctrine"
hinges entirely upon whether or not the United States acknowledges its
trust relationship with tribes. It also assumes that there is some rationality
to what Congress or the Court does, although trust and rationality have
been the exception, rather than the norm, in federal policy and law.
In conclusion, I suggest that Congress, working closely with tribal
governments, should act under its plenary exclusive power to clarify what
rights indigenous nations and their members possess and may exercise
under treaties, trust, and statutory law based on their sovereign national
status. This would include jurisdictional authority over peoples and places
in their territories, tax exemptions, rights to hunt and fish, sovereign
immunity protections, racial preferences, et cetera. Congress should also
clarify, in partnership with tribes, what rights indigenous nations and their
members possess and may exercise under their status as federal and state

16.

417 U.S. 535 (1974).

17.

528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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citizens, or as sub-units, and as governments, when they are using funds for
highways, providing certain social services, such as unemployment
compensation, and so on. They should then educate the American public
about how these two broad statuses, tribes as sovereign nations whose
citizens are also citizens of the United States and the states, are not
irreconcilable.
Finally, Congress should clarify its own responsibilities in the field of
Indian affairs. When tribes are statutorily accorded a status of corporation,
or are treated as states for purposes of environmental and tax laws, are
these political statuses that trace back to their aboriginal standing as
preexisting sovereigns, or are they devolutions of federal power to the
tribes, which, for purposes of the specific statute, act as federal
instrumentalities or as arms of the federal government? That is a
fundamental question to which we still do not have an answer.
This highlights one of the most important questions that tribal, federal,
and state policymakers must address: Are tribes inherent sovereigns acting
as policy partners with the United States and the states-which is generally
the indigenous view-or are they units of government entitled to exercise
only those powers expressly delegated to them by Congress? This is
increasingly the view of a small but powerful group of United States
policymakers and Supreme Court Justices. Until this fundamental question
is resolved and formally incorporated at all governmental levels, the
multitude of statuses indigenous peoples have, both collectively and
individually, and the verifiable indigenous axis of insecurity will continue
to proliferate, leading to even greater political, cultural, and intergovernmental confusion and tension.

